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Abstract
Using a large information Bayesian VAR, we approximate the flow of informa-
tion received by economic agents to investigate the effects of government spending.
We document robust evidence that insufficiency of information in conventional
models could explain inconsistent results across samples and identifications (Re-
cursive Structural VAR and Expectational VAR). Furthermore, we report hetero-
geneous effects of government spending components. While aggregate government
spending does not appear to produce a strong stimulative effect with output mul-
tiplier around 0.7, government investment components have multipliers well above
unity. Also, state and local consumption, which captures investment in education
and health, elicits a strong response.
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1 Introduction
The severity and duration of the economic downturn stemming from the 2007-2008
global financial crisis has been unprecedented in recent history. With conventional mon-
etary policy instruments facing a binding zero lower bound, fiscal policy has experienced
renewed interest as a tool for economic stabilisation and growth. In the immediate after-
math of the financial crisis, many developed countries implemented large fiscal stimulus
packages. Subsequently, the protracted economic stagnation coupled with high levels of
public debt in many countries has raised questions about the long-run sustainability of
government budgets and focused attention on fiscal adjustment measures.
Ideally, policy makers would like to engineer stimulus packages that elicit strong
positive responses from the economy, and fiscal adjustments that result in only mild
contractionary effects. Hence, the timing and composition of fiscal maneuvers have
been intensely debated (see Alesina et al. (2012), and Blanchard and Leigh (2013)). In
particular, during the recent downturn much attention has been devoted to government
investment, such as in infrastructure, aimed at stimulating economic activity (see e.g.,
Fernald (1999) and Leeper et al. (2010)).
Unfortunately, academic research has provided no clear guidance on the macroeco-
nomic impact of fiscal shocks, with disagreement on the size and even the sign of the
responses of private aggregate demand components. Importantly, there is still a high
degree of uncertainty regarding the potentially heterogeneous macroeconomic effects of
different fiscal instruments and their compatibility with policy objectives.
Policy-makers often use multipliers as summary measures of the response of macroe-
conomic variables to fiscal instruments such as government spending components, trans-
fers and taxes.1 As a result, the empirical measurement of multipliers has been a major
objective for research on fiscal policy. While different identification strategies and em-
1For example, government spending multipliers are defined as the ratios of changes in output, con-
sumption, or investment to changes in government spending.
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pirical settings have been used to isolate fiscal shocks and to estimate their effects, to
date a consensus view has not emerged. Reported government spending multipliers are
vastly different across identifications, highly unstable and sensitive to the choice of sam-
ple periods, ranging from around 0.6 to 1.8. The empirical literature in this area is vast
and a detailed review is beyond the scope of this paper. Recent surveys on government
spending multipliers can be found in Ramey (2011b), Hall (2009) and Parker (2011).2
This paper uses a large information approach to make two main contributions to
the literature on government spending multipliers: (1) we examine informational insuf-
ficiency as the potential source of inconsistencies in previously reported results; and (2)
we investigate the heterogeneous effects of different components of government spending.
In particular, we disaggregate U.S. government spending into consumption and invest-
ment components of federal defense, federal non-defense, and state and local spending.
As a result, we outline a more complete and coherent picture of the macroeconomic
effects of government spending shocks on a comprehensive set of macroeconomic vari-
ables.
A key understanding underlying modern economic theory is that agents base their
decisions on all information currently available to them. This crucial fact, well embedded
in stylised economic models, has been generally overlooked in empirical research. In
fact, prior literature in empirical fiscal policy has mostly used small information sets
and a marginal approach to measure the effects of a change in government spending (see
Christiano et al. (1996)).
An obvious requirement for the empirical analysis to be meaningful is that the vari-
2From a theoretical point of view, the effects of an increase in government spending are ambiguous
and model dependent. While the neoclassical Real Business Cycle (RBC) and the old Keynesian and
neo-Keynesian models are broadly consistent with regard to the effect of expansionary government
spending on output, they reach different conclusions on the magnitude of the multiplier based on the
sign of the response of consumption, investment and real wages. In particular, the RBC model generally
predicts that consumption is negatively related to government spending while the Keynesian and some
neo-Keynesian models predict a positive relation (e.g., Baxter and King (1993), and Gal´ı et al. (2007)).
A large number of recent theoretical papers have studied the effectiveness of an increase in government
spending in various settings (see Woodford (2011), Hall (2009), Christiano et al. (2011), Monacelli and
Perotti (2008), Corsetti et al. (2011), among others).
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ables incorporated in the model convey all of the relevant information available to eco-
nomic agents. Therefore, we apply a comprehensive large information approach with full
Bayesian VAR techniques to study the economic effects of fiscal policy shocks. As shown
by Banbura et al. (2010), a Large Bayesian VAR allows the econometrician to signifi-
cantly expand the dataset in order to analyse shocks, possibly aligning the information
set used in the econometric analysis with that of economic agents.3
There are three possible explanations for the inconsistent results previously reported
in the literature on government spending. First, the identification of fiscal shocks is
challenging due to potential anticipation effects of fiscal policy changes and their lagged
implementation, as highlighted by Ramey (2011a). Second, aggregate spending may
conceal changes in the composition of government spending over time. In fact, policy-
makers can activate a variety of fiscal instruments including government spending com-
ponents, and each may elicit potentially different effects. Finally, a growing number of
papers convincingly point out that government spending multipliers are not structural
constants, but rather the responses of endogenous variables to shocks in government
spending. As such, there is no single government spending multiplier and its value is
likely to depend on the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy, the degree of
openness of the market, the way in which spending is financed, the budget deficit level, as
well as the economic phase. These three issues can be viewed as three facets of the same
underlying problem: the misalignment of the information sets of the econometrician and
the agents.
Our large information approach allows us to expand the econometric information set
to control for fiscal foresight, heterogeneity in fiscal instruments, and relevant omitted
variables. A key intuition is that anticipated fiscal shocks are captured by forward
looking variables (e.g., commodity prices, financial markets, inventories, consumer and
3Banbura et al. (2010) show that by applying Bayesian shrinkage, it is possible to handle large
unrestricted VARs that allow application of the VAR framework to empirical problems that require the
analysis of large data sets, potentially solving the issue of omitted variable bias.
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business confidence, among others).4
We document that: (1) fiscal shocks identified using a marginal approach in standard
recursive fiscal SVARs and Expectational VARs (EVARs) are likely to have been antic-
ipated by economic agents, and are forecastable using factors extracted from a larger
information set. (2) The previously reported inconsistent multipliers can be partly ex-
plained by missing information. In fact, recursive SVARs and EVARs deliver virtually
identical estimates of dynamic responses when a large information dataset is used. Also,
government spending multipliers are stable across samples and the well known sample
instability of the estimates for the multipliers appears to be reduced to a statistically
insignificant level. (3) In the aggregate, government spending does not appear to pro-
duce a strong stimulative effect with multipliers well below unity. Consumption, private
investment and real wages are mostly unresponsive to slightly negative. The positive re-
sponses previously found in small VARs are possibly due to informational insufficiency.
(4) We estimate fiscal multipliers for disaggregated components of government spend-
ing at federal and state and local levels, and report remarkably heterogeneous dynamic
responses. In fact, non-defense and state and local components generally produce larger
responses than the defense components. Significantly, investment components have large
multipliers, hinting at a positive effect of public capital on economic activity. In addi-
tion, state and local consumption multipliers are around 4 in the long-run. Since a large
portion of state and local spending is on education, this can be seen as investment in
human capital.
Our paper is closely related, in spirit, to Forni and Gambetti (2010), in which gov-
ernment spending shocks are studied using a large factor model and sign restrictions.
The common underlying intuition is that large dimension datasets incorporating forward
looking variables are necessary to close the gap between the information sets of economic
4The informational sufficiency of the set of variables in a VAR is testable (see Giannone and Reichlin
(2006), and Forni and Gambetti (2011)). Using this test we verify that our information set conveys
sufficient information to identify fiscal shocks.
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agents and the econometrician. The advantage of using a Large Bayesian VAR is that
we are able to treat variables in a more transparent manner, bridging the gap between
different identification strategies and reconciling previously reported inconsistencies. In
fact, our model is able to nest previously used models and identifications (recursive and
expectational). More generally, factor models are less general than VAR models and
impose restricted VAR relations among variables.
Our paper adds robust evidence to the recent literature studying heterogeneous ef-
fects of fiscal instruments. Mertens and Ravn (2013) study the effects of personal and
corporate income tax changes, while several papers study the different effects of invest-
ment and consumption, or federal and state and local government spending components,
using a small information marginal approach (for example, Perotti (2011), Pappa (2009),
Be´ne´trix (2012), and Bouakez et al. (2013)).
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the identification
of fiscal shocks and motivates our use of the large information information approach,
Section 3 introduces our large information fiscal Bayesian VAR, Section 4 presents our
empirical findings and Section 5 concludes.
2 Identification of Fiscal Shocks
Empirical identification of government spending shocks requires isolating innovations
that are uncorrelated with other contemporaneous economic shocks, and that are distinct
from systematic business cycle variations.
Prior literature on fiscal shocks using time-series techniques has almost exclusively
used small information sets, resorting to amarginal approach. Typically, in this approach
a small VAR model is developed with a core set of variables. The effects of fiscal shocks
are examined on these variables, and other variables that are added one at a time
(see Christiano et al. (1996)). This approach may present two issues: (1) the potential
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omission of relevant variables; and (2) limited comparability among the impulse response
functions.
These issues are related to the general problem of informational insufficiency of the
econometric model due to the misalignment of the information sets available to the
agents and the econometrician. In the case of fiscal shocks, this misalignment can be
related to missing information in the econometric model about: (1) the flow of informa-
tion about the future path of fiscal variables (fiscal foresight and non-fundamentalness);
(2) heterogeneity of fiscal instruments (heterogeneity of components and instability of
aggregate government spending); and (3) various variables interacting with fiscal policy,
such as monetary policy, credit and financial market conditions, and openness of the
markets, among others (omitted variables). This misalignment has relevant implica-
tions not only for the estimate of the transmission parameters but also for the correct
identification of fiscal shocks.
2.1 Small Information Marginal Approach
Following the influential paper of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), works using Structural
Vector Autoregressions (SVARs) have identified fiscal shocks using restrictions moti-
vated by economic theory, e.g., recursive identification (see Perotti (2005, 2008) and
Gal´ı et al. (2007)) or sign restrictions (see Mountford and Uhlig (2009)).
As summarised by Hall (2009) and Ramey (2011b), prior empirical literature using
SVARs generally finds output multipliers in the range from 0.6 to 1.8, and consumption
multipliers in the range from somewhat negative to 0.5. These studies also usually find
that a positive government spending shock raises worked hours and real wages, while
having a negligible impact on private investment.
Building on the narrative approach, Ramey (2011a) argues that estimated govern-
ment spending shocks in SVARs are likely to be anticipated. This can lead to a spurious
finding of a positive effect of government spending shocks on consumption and real
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wages.
Economic agents receive a constant flow of information about future changes in
fiscal policy, informed by the institutional process through which they are implemented.
In particular, changes in fiscal policy occur after two lags: the first between the initial
proposal of a new fiscal measure and its approval (decision lag), and the second between
enactment of the legislation and its actual implementation (implementation lag).
While economic agents react to the announcement of policy changes occurring in
future periods, the econometrician only observes the innovation produced in fiscal vari-
ables by the lagged implementation of the new policy. This phenomenon, known as
fiscal foresight, poses significant challenges for identification of fiscal shocks.
VAR models always implicitly assume informational sufficiency. This implies that
structural economic shocks can be recovered as linear combinations of the residuals from
the linear projection of a vector of economic variables onto their past values.
However, in the presence of fiscal foresight, to recover the true fiscal shocks hit-
ting the economy the econometrician should relate present changes in macroeconomic
variables to future innovations in fiscal variables. Therefore, fiscal shocks and their dy-
namic responses cannot be estimated from current and past fiscal data, as assumed in
conventional dynamic econometric models and the structural shocks are said to be non-
fundamental for the VAR specification (Hansen and Sargent (1980), Lippi and Reichlin
(1993), Leeper et al. (2013), Mertens and Ravn (2010)).5,6
Non-fundamentalness can be framed as a problem of informational insufficiency,
originating from the misalignment of the respective information sets of the econome-
trician and agents. In the context of fiscal foresight, this misalignment is due to news
flow about future policy changes conveyed by the institutional implementation process
that is not observed by the econometrician. The natural solution to deal with non-
5A comprehensive review on non-fundamentalness in structural econometric models can be found in
Alessi et al. (2011).
6In a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE), fiscal foresight can produce a non-invertible
moving-average (MA) component into the equilibrium process, as discussed in Leeper et al. (2013).
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fundamentalness is to include more information in the econometrician’s information set;
this idea underpins most of the solutions proposed in the empirical literature on fiscal
shocks.7
One solution proposed in Ramey (2011a) is to augment the VAR with variables that
can proxy for changes in agents’ expectations about the present value of government
spending, developing an Expectational VAR (EVAR). In Ramey (2011a) two different
measures of expectations are proposed: a military news variable based on narrative
evidence for defense spending and a fiscal expectations variable based on the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF). Using this approach, Ramey (2011a) finds that fiscal
shocks have a positive effect on GDP upon impact, but crowd out private consumption
and investment. Other proxy variables for fiscal expectations have been proposed by
Leeper et al. (2013) using the spread between municipal and treasury bonds and Fisher
and Peters (2010) using stock returns of U.S. defense contractors. The disadvantage of
using proxy variables for expectations is that, to some extent, whether these variables
are able to correctly capture agents’ expectations or not is a matter of assumptions.
2.2 Heterogeneity of Fiscal Shocks
Informational insufficiency can also be due to the components of government spend-
ing that could appear as potentially relevant omitted variables. First, the composition
of spending has undergone a remarkable shift through time, raising doubts about the
stability of the macroeconomic properties of the aggregate government spending vari-
able. Table 1 presents the breakdown of U.S. government spending on consumption
7A different approach, proposed in Lippi and Reichlin (1994) consists of applying appropriate
Blaschke matrices to the VAR innovations in order to retrieve the fundamental shocks. The Blaschke
matrices transform the recovered innovations into linear combinations of past and future innovations,
allowing a non-fundamental MA representation to be mapped into a fundamental one. Mertens and
Ravn (2010) have estimated the effects of government spending shocks using Blaschke matrices. The
disadvantage of this approach is the non-uniqueness of Blaschke matrices. Additional restrictions de-
rived from theoretical models are necessary to identify the correct MA component among different
possible MA representations.
9
and investment over the last 50 years. Defense spending has fallen from 45.7 percent
of total government spending in 1960 to 27.6 percent in 2010, while federal non-defense
spending has stayed at around 10 percent. During the same period, state and local
spending has increased from 45.2 percent in 1960 to 58.9 percent in 2010, with most of
the increase stemming from consumption expenditures. However, during the most recent
period (2010) continued post-9/11 military spending, crisis related fiscal stimulus and
contracting state budgets have reversed this trend, increasing the relative size of federal
spending. Investment components of spending, especially defense investment, were high
during the 1960s and subsequently declined, as also reported by Fernald (1999).8
Second, government consumption and investment includes the purchase of a large
variety of goods and services that may activate demand and supply channels differently.
In particular, civilian investment components can have a direct effect on the aggregate
production function and can be a source of externalities. Other categories of spending
such as education, healthcare and public safety can have both productive effects (e.g.,
through the accumulation of human capital) and effects on marginal rates of substitution
by entering in the utility function of economic agents. Table 1 reports the functional
decomposition of federal and state and local spending. Over the last 50 years, fed-
eral spending has tilted towards civilian spending on healthcare and public safety, and
away from defense spending. During the same time, the composition of state and local
spending shows a decline in transportation and an increase in general public service
and public safety. Education is the largest component of state and local spending at
around 43 percent. The presence of spending components with productive effects and
externalities creates challenges in understanding the channels through which spending
operates and in interpreting multipliers.
8It is worth noting that in national accounts, defense investment captures both the building of
military infrastructure, as well as the acquisition of military equipment and stockpiling of weapons that
provide a flow of future national security services but may have reduced productive effects.
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2.3 Large Information Approach
A comprehensive theoretical approach to deal with insufficient information and non-
fundamentalness has been proposed in Giannone and Reichlin (2006). The key idea
is to use large datasets to address non-fundamentalness and to detect informational
insufficiency with Granger causality tests.9 As proved in Giannone and Reichlin (2006),
structural shocks are correctly recovered using large information under the assumptions
that the shocks of interest are pervasive throughout the cross-section and that they
generate heterogeneous dynamics. The remaining shocks need not propagate too widely
and therefore, can meaningfully be considered idiosyncratic. In our case, the intuition
for this approach is that anticipated fiscal shocks can be captured by including forward
looking variables such as commodity prices, financial markets, inventories, consumer
and business confidence, among others.
Informational sufficiency and non-fundamentalness can be assessed by testing whether
the VAR residuals of the variables of interest are weakly exogenous with respect to po-
tentially relevant additional variables or factors extracted from them. The intuition for
this test, proposed in Forni and Gambetti (2011), is that if additional variables contain
relevant information useful to forecast innovations to the economic variables of interest,
then this information may have been used by economic agents.
The most suitable econometric models to incorporate large datasets are Factor Aug-
mented VARs (e.g., Bernanke et al. (2004)), dynamic factor models (Forni et al. (2000,
2009)), and the recently proposed Large Bayesian VARs (see De Mol et al. (2008);
Banbura et al. (2010)).
In this paper we adopt a Large Bayesian VAR approach that allows a transparent
treatment of variables, facilitates a comparison of different identification strategies, and
nests different empirical models.
9Very large dataset (𝑁 ∼ 100) are considered to be a good approximation for the whole economy.
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3 A Large Bayesian Fiscal Structural VAR
3.1 Empirical Model
A natural solution for this is to expand the information set used in the econometric
analysis. In particular, we would like to expand the set of variables to include: (1) the
components of government spending as well as other relevant fiscal variables to control
for the issue of heterogeneity of fiscal instruments and instability of the aggregate; (2) a
number of forward looking variables that may capture the flow of information received
by agents to deal with the fiscal foresight and non-fundamentalness issue; and (3) other
omitted variables (e.g., variables related to financial markets, credit markets, monetary
policy, international trade, etc.) that may be relevant in determining the economic
environment and agents’ decisions.
Unfortunately, in standard VAR models, the estimation of the parameters of models
with a large number of variables is obstructed by the curse of dimensionality. Large
Bayesian VARs offer a viable solution to this problem. Banbura et al. (2010) show that
by applying Bayesian techniques, it is possible to handle large unrestricted VARs. This
allows the VAR framework to be applied to empirical problems that require large data
sets, potentially solving the issue of informational insufficiency. In particular, they show
that for the analysis of data sets characterised by strong collinearity, which is typically
the case for macroeconomic time series, it is possible to increase the cross-sectional
dimension by consistently setting the informativeness of the priors in relation to the size
of the model. Large Bayesian VARs have proven to be competitive with factor models in
terms of forecasting ability, and allow for a more flexible and transparent treatment of
large information datasets (Banbura et al. (2010); Giannone et al. (2012); Koop (2011)).
Moreover, they have a clear interpretation in terms of factor analysis and of Mixed Thail
estimation (De Mol et al. (2008)).
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We consider different specifications of the following VAR(4) model:
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐶 + 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑦𝑡−2 + 𝐴3𝑦𝑡−3 + 𝐴4𝑦𝑡−4 + 𝜀𝑡 (1)
where 𝜀𝑡 is an n-dimensional Gaussian white noise, with covariance matrix Σ𝜀, 𝑦𝑡 is a
𝑛 × 1 vector of endogenous variable and 𝐶, 𝐴1,. . . , 𝐴4 and Σ𝜀 are matrices of suitable
dimensions containing the model’s unknown parameters. In our setting, the dimension
of 𝑦𝑡 can be large. Following Banbura et al. (2010), we embed prior beliefs in the form of
dummy observations to artificially expand the length of our sample, as done in Banbura
et al. (2010). In particular, we use a natural conjugate variant of the Minnesota priors
proposed in Doan et al. (1983) and Litterman (1979). These priors assumes that in
first approximations all the variables behave independently either as random walks or
white noises.10 We also adopt a refinement of the Minnesota prior known as sum-of-
coefficients prior (Sims (1980)).11 The informativeness of the priors, i.e., the relative
weight of priors with respect to actual observations, is controlled by hyperparameters.
In selecting the value of the hyperparameters of our priors, we adopt the pure
Bayesian method proposed in Giannone et al. (2012). From a purely Bayesian per-
spective, the informativeness of the prior distribution is one of the many unknown pa-
rameters of the model that can be inferred given the conditional posterior distribution
of the observed data. In particular, the hyperparameters can be optimally chosen by
maximising the one-step-ahead out-of-sample forecasting ability of the model. Using fre-
quentist intuition, this method effectively reduces the estimation error while generating
only relatively small biases in the estimates of the parameters.12
10This prior shrinks all VAR coefficients towards zero except for coefficients on own lags of each
dependent variable. The latter is either set to one - for those variables which are thought to be
relatively persistent - or zero, otherwise.
11This prior works to suppress initial transients, and also provides an approximate representation of
widely shared prior beliefs that unit roots are present in macroeconomic datasets.
12The use of our Bayesian priors introduces a bias toward zero in the estimates of the VAR coefficients
and hence of the IRFs (except for coefficients on own lags of each dependent variable). For this reason,
our estimated multipliers can be better framed as lower bounds, in absolute values, on the value of the
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In a Technical and Data Appendix, we discuss the econometric approach in detail.
Also, we present a simple model to illustrate the issue of non-fundamentalness and
motivate the use of a large information approach.
3.2 Identification
To identify fiscal shocks, we employ two different approaches: a Structural VAR (SVAR)
with recursive identification and an Expectational VAR (EVAR) using government
spending forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Recursive identifi-
cation exploits decision lags in fiscal policy-making to identify unexpected fiscal shocks.
Specifically, in the different versions of our SVAR the shock variable is always ordered
first.13
Following Ramey (2011a), in our EVAR we use SPF forecast data to control for
agents’ expectations of government spending. Unfortunately, it is not possible to include
these SPF forecasts in levels in the VAR, as would be natural to do, since the base year
changes several times in the sample. To overcome this issue, the surprises in government
spending are defined as
Δ𝑔𝑓.𝑒𝑟𝑟.𝑡 = Δ𝑔𝑡 −Δ𝑔𝑒𝑡|𝑡−1 = (𝑔𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡−1)− (𝑔𝑒𝑡|𝑡−1 − 𝑔𝑒𝑡−1|𝑡−1) (2)
where Δ𝑔𝑓.𝑒𝑟𝑟.𝑡 is the forecast error in the growth rate of government spending, Δ𝑔𝑡 and
Δ𝑔𝑒𝑡|𝑡−1 are the realised growth rate and the forecasted growth rate one quarter before,
respectively. This definition assumes that the SPF forecasts are good proxies for the
representative agent’s expectations. Moreover, it also assumes that agents know the
value of government spending in the current quarter.
multipliers. However, by selecting the informativeness of the priors optimally, the bias introduced is
not substantially larger than the small sample bias of the standard flat-prior VAR (see Giannone et al.
(2012)).
13A fixed ordering of the government spending components with defense spending components ordered
first does not alter the results.
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Perotti (2011) has noted that professional forecasters in SPF do not know the value
of 𝑔𝑡. For this reason he proposes to decompose these forecast errors as
Δ𝑔𝑓.𝑒𝑟𝑟.𝑡 = Δ𝑔𝑡 −Δ𝑔𝑒𝑡|𝑡−1 = (Δ𝑔𝑡 −Δ𝑔𝑒𝑡|𝑡)⏟  ⏞  
time t’s surprise in Δ𝑔𝑡
+ (Δ𝑔𝑒𝑡|𝑡 −Δ𝑔𝑒𝑡|𝑡−1)⏟  ⏞  
revision of expectation of Δ𝑔𝑡
(3)
where the first term captures the realisation of government spending growth over its
expectations in 𝑡 and the second term captures the revision of the agent’s expectations
about Δ𝑔𝑡. While the first term is not in the information set of agents at time 𝑡, the
second term is the actual shock to expectations and could proxy for the news in the
information flow of agents, as proposed in neoclassical models.
In our EVAR, the forecast errors defined in eq. (2) and the expectation revision
expressed in eq. (3) are ordered first, and used as shock variables.
3.3 Data Description
Our main macroeconomic variables of interest are consumption and investment com-
ponents of federal, and state and local government spending, gross domestic product,
the Barro-Redlick marginal tax rate, real wages, total worked hours, output per hour,
personal consumption of durables, nondurables, and services, real private investment,
real rates, and the real exchange rate. We use quarterly data from 1959Q1 to 2012Q1
in real log per capita levels for all variables except those expressed in rates. Real rates
are measured using the three-month U.S. Treasury Bill rate adjusted for changes in
the consumer price index. The Barro-Redlick marginal tax rate is the income weighted
average marginal tax rate that is made available by the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
We consider the following VAR specifications:
∙ Small VAR: In the base specification, this is a 5 variable VAR with a fixed set of
variables including government spending (or one of its components), marginal tax
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rate, gross domestic product, and real rates, as well as a rotating fifth variable
of interest including real wages, total worked hours, output per hour, personal
consumption of durables, nondurables, and services, real private investment, and
the real exchange rate.
∙ Large VAR: In addition to the variables in the Small VAR, this specification
includes as many forward-looking variables as possible in order to approximate
the flow of information received by economic agents. These include tax, savings,
credit, consumer sentiment, asset prices, inventories, production costs, and housing
among others (see Table 5 for a complete list of variables).14 The baseline speci-
fication with aggregate government spending has 43 variables while the expanded
specification with government spending components has 48 variables.
∙ Small and Large EVARs: In the Expectational VAR specifications where the SPF
data are used, the components of government spending are combined to conform
with the level of aggregation in the SPF data.
Furthermore, we collect 128 macroeconomic variables, including sectoral components
which are used to extract commonalities using factor analysis. A brief description of
all the variables used in our study is presented in a Technical and Data Appendix. In
Table 5 we indicate the variables that we apply logarithms to, as well as the variables
with assumed random walk priors. The variables used in the various VAR specifications
are also indicated.
Our 1959Q1-2012Q1 sample period delivers a rich macroeconomic dataset, and ex-
cludes the large military spending shocks related to the Korea War and WWII. We
split this sample period into two subsamples: 1959Q1-1981Q4 and 1982Q1-2012Q1.15
14Following the conjecture in Banbura et al. (2010), we exclude regional and sectoral components of
macroeconomic variables as they appear to not be relevant in order to capture economy-wide structural
shocks. In robustness tests, we include many regional or sectoral variables in our Large VAR and find
unchanged responses lending support to the conjecture.
15In robustness checks we also use a shortened sample (1959Q1-2005Q4) excluding the recent financial
crisis and economic recession and obtain similar results.
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The 1982Q1 split point is chosen in order to assess the subsample instability claimed in
Perotti (2008) and is consistent with a large stream of literature that finds a structural
break in the U.S. economy in the early 1980s. This split point also enables comparability
of the SVAR and EVAR specifications.
4 The Dynamic Effects of Fiscal Shocks
In this section, we present our empirical results. First, we contrast the effects of shocks to
disaggregated components of government spending with shocks to aggregate government
spending. Second, we test the informational content of our Large VAR using factors
extracted from a large dataset of 128 macroeconomic variables. Third, we compare
SVARs with EVARs that incorporate Survey of Professional Forecasters’ expectations for
government spending. Finally, we check the robustness of our results across subsamples.
4.1 Aggregate Versus Disaggregate Government Spending
We start by examining the effects of shocks to aggregate government spending. Figure 1
compares the IRFs obtained for an aggregate government spending shock using the stan-
dard fiscal Small VAR and our Large VAR. The dynamic responses of macroeconomic
variables of interest are plotted for a one percent shock in government spending. The
IRFs can be interpreted as elasticities since the variables are in log–levels. To make the
IRFs easier to read, we only show posterior cover intervals for one standard deviation.
The results remain unchanged at the 0.9 level.
Aggregate Spending Shocks in Small VAR. Looking at the standard fiscal
Small VAR IRFs one would conclude that a positive aggregate government spending
shock elicits a positive and sustained response from GDP and output per hour as well
as from consumption components. Also, real wages initially drop and subsequently
increase, peaking after four quarters, while worked hours start increasing after eight
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quarter. Investment drops on impact and remains in negative territory for sixteen
quarters.
Aggregate Spending Shocks in Large VAR. The Large VAR recounts a different
story. An aggregate government spending shock results in a positive but short lived
stimulus in GDP and output per hour. Crucially, IRFs for consumption components
are generally unresponsive and flat if not negative. Similarly, real wages and worked
hours do not increase following a fiscal spending shock. At the same time, investment
drops on impact, being crowded out by government spending for the entire horizon,
even though not significantly. The income-weighted average marginal tax rate rises on
impact, peaks after a couple of quarters and then declines. Real rates drop upon impact
and then recover after a few quarters, while the real exchange rate increases on impact
(appreciation) and then stabilises after a few quarters. IRFs of the Small VAR are quite
often outside the posterior coverage intervals, and deliver biased estimations.
The fiscal multipliers can be recovered by taking the product of elasticities shown
in the IRFs and the average dollar ratio of the interest variable to the government
shock variable. Multipliers from the Large VAR are reported in Table 2. The GDP
multiplier for aggregate government spending from the Large VAR is 0.72 upon impact
and remains positive and statistically significant for about 4 quarters. The impact
multipliers for durables, nondurables and services consumption are not significantly
different from zero.
However, the aggregate government spending shocks do not tell a complete story
since they mask the underlying heterogeneity of the dynamic responses to different
components of spending.
Disaggregate Spending Shocks in Large VAR. The IRFs for shocks to con-
sumption expenditures components of federal defense, federal non-defense and state
and local spending are presented in Figure 2. Focusing on the Large VAR IRFs, the
three components of government spending appear to induce very different reactions from
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macroeconomic variables. Federal defense consumption elicits a positive, significant but
short lived response from GDP, with an impact multiplier of 0.89, while private con-
sumption is unresponsive and investment is negative. Following a federal non-defense
spending shock GDP drops (not significant), while durables consumption and invest-
ment are crowded out. Finally, state and local consumption shocks produce a slowly
increasing response from GDP, from the components of consumption as well as from
investment that peaks after about 2 to 3 years. The associated GDP multiplier after
eight quarters is 4.38. In addition, nondurables, services consumption, and investment
peak multipliers are above unity, providing a strong feedback effect. As in the aggregate
spending IRFs, the Small VAR delivers biased results.
Investment components of government spending produce starkly different effects on
the variables of interest (see Figure 3). While defense investment has a negative effect
on output, non-defense investment at federal and state and local level appears to provide
strong economic stimulus. A federal non-defense investment shock produces a slowly
rising hump-shaped response that peaks after 2 years, while the largest effect of state
and local investment is upon impact.
The GDP multipliers reported in Table 2 reflect this result with federal defense
investment yielding large negative multipliers within a year. Non-military investment
components result in large statistically significant impact multipliers of 2.66 and 5.76
for state and local and federal non-defense investment, respectively. In addition, federal
non-defense investment has large multipliers, even though estimated with large stan-
dard errors. The consumption IRFs and multipliers are generally close to zero and
insignificant upon impact, except the durables consumption multiplier for state and lo-
cal investment. In addition, private investment responds strongly to federal non-defense
investment with impact and medium-run multipliers well over 1. This may suggest the
activation of a supply channel possibly sparked by increased public capital.
Finally, we assess whether the GDP multipliers for each component are significantly
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different from each other by performing pair-wise tests of differences. The results re-
ported in Table 3 show that at different horizons, many of the multipliers are statistically
different from each other.
The above results show that the different components of government spending elicit
remarkably heterogeneous responses from output, consumption and investment. Gener-
ally, the non-defense and state and local components produce more positive responses
while the same does not hold true for defense components. In particular, investment
components have larger multipliers than consumption components hinting at a direct
productive effect on economic activity.
4.2 Fiscal Foresight and Informational Sufficiency
The presence of fiscal foresight and non-fundamentalness in the different empirical mod-
els can be examined using the information sufficiency test proposed in Forni and Gam-
betti (2011). The test can be implemented by extracting factors from a large dataset
assumed to encompass all macroeconomic information, and checking for Granger causal-
ity of the identified fiscal shocks. The intuition supporting this test is that if the factors
contain relevant information useful for forecasting fiscal shocks, then economic agents
could have used this information to alter their behaviour prior to the realisation of the
forecasted spending shock.
We use this informational sufficiency test to assess different empirical specifications.
First, we test informational sufficiency of the Small VAR and the Large VAR. Then, we
verify the forecastability of SPF forecast errors, the “Ramey” military spending news
variable, and the residuals from a small EVAR.
We use a large dataset of 128 variables to extract five factors that explain over 99
percent of the variance in the data.16 We use these five factors to conduct Granger
16We used several criteria to assess the appropriate number of factors to extract, including variance
explained, the criteria proposed in Bai and Ng (2002), and the Onatski (2009) test. We chose the
largest number proposed in the different tests. Factors are extracted using an EM algorithm.
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causality tests on the residuals of government spending and the components of gov-
ernment spending from the Small and Large VARs for the full sample and the two
subsamples.
Table 4 reports the results for the Granger causality tests. In the Small VAR with
total government spending, Factor 3 Granger causes the residuals for the full sample as
well as for the 1959Q1 to 1981Q4 subsample. Similarly, in the Small VAR with the com-
ponents of government spending, Factor 3 appears to Granger cause the residuals from
defense, non-defense and state and local investment and state and local consumption.
In addition, Factor 4 Granger causes the residuals from defense and state and local in-
vestment, while Factor 5 those from state and local consumption and investment. Most
are significant at the 5 percent level. These results suggest that fiscal shocks are non-
fundamental in the Small VAR possibly due to fiscal foresight. Using a different test,
Forni and Gambetti (2010) report similar strong non-fundamentalness results for a 6
variable VAR.
We test whether the variables that proxy for expectations of government spending
proposed in Ramey (2011a) can convey information sufficient to correctly pin down the
timing of fiscal shocks. We conduct Granger causality tests on “Ramey” forecast errors
and VAR residuals, using SPF forecast data on federal and state and local spending, as
well as expectation revisions as defined in Perotti (2011). Overall, the factors Granger
cause the “Ramey” federal and state and local spending forecast errors mostly at 5
percent significance level. Also the Small EVAR residuals associated with government
spending forecast errors appear to be Granger caused, albeit at around 15 percent
significance level. Similarly, the expectation revisions for federal spending are Granger
caused by Factor 1 and Factor 3, while expectation revisions for state and local spending
are Granger cause by Factor 3 as well. Finally, we also conduct a Granger causality test
using the “Ramey” military spending news variable and find that it is Granger caused
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by Factor 2 at the 5 percent significance level.17
Although the expectation proxy variables may provide some additional information
useful to approximate the agents’ information set, this approach is most likely still not
able to correctly identify fiscal shocks. Instead, expanding the set of variables to the
Large VAR appears to provide sufficient information to correctly identify fiscal shocks,
overcoming fiscal foresight issues. Indeed, none of the factors appear to Granger cause
the Large VAR residuals of government spending in any specification or subsample.
In order to better understand these result we study the partial correlations of the
factors with the variables in the dataset. These correlations confirm the importance of
including forward looking variables in the VAR specifications in order to approximate
the agents’ information set: Factor 1 is correlated with public finances variables (debt
and deficit) and rates; Factor 2 with commodity and producer price indices as well
as consumer sentiment; Factor 3 with taxes, public finance variables, labour and credit
market variables, inventories and money supply; Factor 4 with CEO confidence, housing
starts, industrial production and private investment; and Factor 5 with equity market
returns and industrial activity indices.18
4.3 SVAR versus EVAR
To test the potential source of disagreement between the SVAR and EVAR as proposed
in Ramey (2011a), we compare IRFs from recursive and expectation identifications
(incorporating SPF data) estimated using the small and large models. Informational
sufficiency of the dataset incorporated in the Large VAR would imply that the proxy
variables for expectations should not provide additional information. Provided that
17The military news variable has very low predictive power for post-1955 samples, that exclude WWII
and the Korea War, as discussed in Ramey (2011a).
18The relevance of including forward looking variables, such as commodity prices, in the VAR speci-
fication to capture agents’ expectations is recognised since the seminal work of Sims (1992). Moreover,
Favero and Giavazzi (2007) argue in favour of including the path of public debt in the VAR in order to
correctly recover fiscal shocks.
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fiscal shocks are correctly identified under both specifications, a Large Structural VAR
and a Large Expectational VAR should yield the same results and IRFs in statistical
terms.
The results for aggregate federal spending are shown in Figure 4.19 The IRFs show
the dynamic response of macroeconomic variables to a shock in “Ramey” forecasts errors
normalised such that federal government spending peaks at one, as done in Perotti
(2011). Using this methodology allows a direct comparison of IRFs from the SVARs
and the EVARs.
The Large SVARs and EVARs deliver strikingly similar results, while the Small
SVARs and EVARs deliver different results. This suggests that missing information
may explain the different results obtained from different identifications.20 This also
corroborates our findings from the Granger causality tests and provides a strong indica-
tion of the informational sufficiency of the Large SVAR specification. A complementary
possible explanation for these results, as observed in Perotti (2011) is that the strong
predictive power of “Ramey” forecast error for government spending reported in Ramey
(2011a) is partially due to the low predictive power of expected government spending
growth. The forecast error is almost equivalent to actual spending growth less some
noise.
The IRFs reported in the first two columns of Figure 4 compare results for Small and
Large SVARs and EVARs for aggregate federal spending. The Small EVAR IRFs are
similar to those reported by Ramey (2011a), but we find shallower troughs for the Large
EVAR, although not always significant. However, in the Large VARs aggregate state
and local spending shocks result in positive hump-shaped IRFs for output, consumption
and investment, as well as real wages.
19In the VAR specifications where the forecast errors are used, they are ordered first. For the federal
spending VAR, the various components of federal spending (consumption and investment components
of federal defense and non-defense) are aggregated as the SPF forecasts are at an aggregate level.
20For the sake of brevity, only federal spending results are reported. Large SVARs and EVARs for
state and local spending also deliver almost identical results.
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Finally, we explore a different specification of the EVARs that includes agents’ ex-
pectation revisions as defined by Perotti (2011). IRFs for aggregate federal spending
are reported in the last columns of Figures 4. The shapes of the IRFs are intriguingly
different from the Ramey EVAR specification and may suggest the stimulative effect
of news on fiscal spending. Also, they seem to indicate that revisions of expectations
affect agents’ behaviour in real-time. However, the low statistical significance of the
IRFs also points to the high level of noise contained in this alternative measure for
expectations. See Ricco (2013) who uses a refined measure for fiscal news and reports
consistent results.
4.4 Subsample Instability
Finally, we examine the issue of sample instability of dynamic responses to fiscal shocks
that has been highlighted by numerous studies. A common finding using U.S. data is
that the government spending multipliers vary depending on the sample studied (e.g.,
Perotti (2008), Ramey (2011b), Hall (2009)). This instability could be caused either
by the presence of structural breaks (e.g., credit market developments or changes in
the fiscal-monetary policy regime), or by variations in the composition of government
spending over time. Another possible source of instability may be omitted variables
and non-fundamentalness of structural shocks in the empirical model. Therefore, as
robustness check, we investigate potential sample instability by splitting our full sample
period of 1959Q1 to 2012Q1 into two subsamples, covering 1959Q1 to 1981Q4 and
1982Q1 to 2012Q1.
Figure 5 presents the impulse responses to a shock in total government spending
over 24 quarters for the full sample as well as for the two subsamples. The plots also
show the posterior coverage intervals at the 0.68 and 0.9 levels. While the IRFs for the
Small VAR exhibit subsample instability, the Large VAR IRFs do not. In particular,
the Small VAR shows subsample instability across all the variables we study, including
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GDP, durables and nondurables consumption, investment and real rates. Conversely, in
the Large VAR the IRFs for both subsamples are within the posterior coverage interval
at the 0.68 level for virtually all the horizons. The residual variation across subsamples
may be accounted for by the changing composition of government spending over time.21
The Large VAR responses to a shock in government spending are positive and signif-
icant for GDP, insignificant for nondurables and durables consumption and investment,
and negative and significant for real rates.22
Overall, these results for the Large VAR suggest that the previously reported sub-
sample instability is not due to structural changes but instead points to an omitted
variable problem. Also, given the consistency of results, the Large VAR can be used for
different subsamples without loss of validity (e.g., our analysis of government expecta-
tions over 1982Q2-2012Q1).
4.5 Discussion of Results
Our empirical results confirm the intuition that given the forward looking behaviour of
agents “information matters” in order to understand the effects of fiscal policy. There-
fore, it is necessary to enlarge the information set used in the econometric analysis to
capture the flow of information in the economy.
In the aggregate, government spending appears to stimulate output with a less then
unity multiplier, due to the crowding out of investment and unresponsiveness of con-
sumption. However, our Large VAR uncovers multipliers that crucially depend on the
component of government spending as they manifest starkly heterogenous effects. Con-
sumption components appear to have short lived and relatively weak effects. State and
21Results are robust to the exclusion of the recent financial crisis. Also, the results for the subsample
1982Q1-2012Q1 are robust to the inclusion of additional potentially forward-looking variables, including
Conference Board CEO confidence index, Conference Board consumer confidence index, U.S. housing
price index and NASDAQ returns. These variables are not available for the full sample.
22The subsample instability is also not present in the Large VAR for shocks to the components of
government spending.
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local consumption stands out as providing a slow growing but sustained stimulus to
output, consumption components and investment. A large portion of state and local
spending is devoted to education, which can be framed as investment in human capital.
This could be a possible explanation for both the large multipliers and the slow growing
pass-through effect.
Non-defense investment components, that are considered to be directly productive,
provide large stimulative effects on economic activity, boosting consumption and invest-
ment. The accumulation of public capital and its impact on the aggregate production
function may account for these responses. Similar results on government investment
have been reported in Aschauer (1989) and in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012).
Also, from a theoretical perspective, Baxter and King (1993) consider the multiplier
effects of an increase in investment in public capital in a neoclassical setting. In line
with our findings, they show that in the case of public capital that raises the marginal
product of private inputs, multipliers can be quite large, somewhere between 4 and 13
in the long run.
Defense investment depresses economic activity. As surprising as it may appear,
it could be explained by recalling that in national accounting purchases of military
hardware meant to be stocked and used in the future are accounted for as investment.
Possibly this component of defense investment accounts for a large portion of its varia-
tion.
Our results suggest that fiscal foresight can be effectively dealt with by incorporating
a rich macroeconomic dataset in a Large Bayesian Structural VAR. Findings indicate
a possible direction to reconcile findings previously reported in the literature. First,
informational sufficiency tests show that small VARs using a marginal approach are
generally misspecified and prone to non-fundamentalness and fiscal foresight issues. In
fact, the fiscal shocks recovered from these models appear to be forecastable using a
larger information set, confirming Ramey’s criticism of this approach. Proposed proxy
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variables for expectations of government spending still do not fully account for the flow
of macroeconomic information received by the agents, and are again predictable using
a broader set of variables.
Second, our Large VAR is robust across identifications of fiscal shocks: structural
recursive and expectation augmented specifications deliver the same results. Further-
more, the recovered shocks appear to be true fiscal innovations, lending credibility to
the use of Large BVARs as a suitable tool for fiscal policy analysis. Finally, the stability
of our results over different samples provides strong indication of the robustness of our
findings, explaining the previously reported instability as an omitted variables artifact.
Our approach suffers from limitations largely common to the SVAR and EVAR
literature. Using a static linear VAR approach, we estimate time-invariant and linear
(marginally constant and symmetric with respect to the sign of the shock) government
multipliers. Therefore, we implicitly assume through our choice of the econometric model
that government spending multipliers are independent of the state of the economy, do
not change with the magnitude of the shock, and that positive and negative shocks
impinge on the economy in a symmetric way (a thoughtful discussion on this point can
be found in Parker (2011)).
However, the government spending multipliers cannot be thought of as deep struc-
tural parameters of the economy. There is no single government spending multiplier and
its value is likely to depend on the country, the economic phase, the interaction between
monetary and fiscal policy regimes in place, and the degree of openness of the econ-
omy (e.g. Woodford (2011); Ilzetzki et al. (2010); Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012);
Hall (2009)). Our IRFs and estimated multipliers should be interpreted as statistical
averages over largely different economic conditions and policies.
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5 Conclusions
In examining the effects of government spending as an active fiscal policy instrument,
we make two main contributions in this paper. First, we show that it is possible to
meaningfully identify government spending shocks using an expanded information set
and Bayesian VAR techniques. We document that fiscal shocks identified using standard
recursive fiscal SVARs and EVARs suffer from informational insufficiency. In fact, fiscal
innovations identified using these models are likely to have been anticipated by economic
agents, and are forecastable using a larger information set. In contrast, Bayesian VAR
techniques with a rich dataset yield multipliers and IRFs that are stable across samples
and identifications, overcoming issues of fiscal foresight and non-fundamentalness.
Second, we estimate fiscal multipliers for different components of government spend-
ing at federal and state and local level, and uncover significant heterogeneity in the
responses of macroeconomic variables. While aggregate government spending does not
appear to produce a strong stimulative effect, federal non-defense investment, and state
and local consumption and investment components generally have output multipliers
well above unity. These findings may help to inform the current fiscal policy debate.
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Figure 1: Large and Small VAR (1959Q1:2012Q1). This figure presents the impulse
response functions to a shock in Government Consumption and Investment. Each chart shows
the Large VAR response for the period 1959Q1 to 2012Q1 as a solid line with shaded posterior
coverage intervals at the 0.68 level. The dashed line in each chart is the response for the Small
VAR for the same period.
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Figure 2: Large and Small VAR – Government Consumption Components
(1959Q1:2012Q1). This figure presents the impulse response functions to a shock in a
specified component of government consumption. The left, middle and right columns of plots
depict the responses to a shock in federal defense consumption, federal non-defense consump-
tion, and state and local consumption, respectively. Each chart shows the Large VAR response
for the period 1959Q1 to 2012Q1 as a solid line with shaded posterior coverage intervals at
the 0.68 level. The dashed line in each chart is the response for the Small VAR for the same
period.
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Figure 3: Large and Small VAR – Government Investment Components
(1959Q1:2012Q1). This figure presents the impulse response functions to a shock in a
specified component of government investment. The left, middle and right columns of plots
depict the responses to a shock in federal defense investment, federal non-defense investment,
and state and local investment, respectively. Each chart shows the Large VAR response for the
period 1959Q1 to 2012Q1 as a solid line with shaded posterior coverage intervals at the 0.68
level. The dashed line in each chart is the response for the Small VAR for the same period.
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Federal Spending SVAR and EVAR Shocks
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Figure 4: Federal Spending SVAR and EVAR (1982Q1:2012Q1). This figure presents
the impulse response functions to a shock in federal spending and federal spending forecasts.
The left, middle and right columns of plots depict the responses to a shock in federal spending,
federal spending forecast error, and federal spending expectation revision, respectively. Each
chart shows the Large VAR response for the period 1982Q1 to 2012Q1 as a solid line with
shaded posterior coverage intervals at the 0.68 and 0.9 level. The dashed line in each chart is
the response for the Small VAR for the same period.
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Government Consumption and Investment Shock − Subsamples
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Figure 5: Government Consumption and Investment Shocks for Subsamples. The
subsample 1959Q1 to 2012Q1 is plotted as a solid line with shaded posterior coverage intervals
at the 0.68 and 0.9 level. The dashed line and dotted lines in each chart are the responses for
the periods 1982Q1 to 2012Q1, and 1959Q1 to 1981Q4, respectively. The left column of plots
shows the Small VAR responses and the right column presents the Large VAR plots for each
subsample.
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Table 1: Government Spending Decomposition (1960 – 2010)
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Government Spending ($ bn) 870.5 1,233.6 1,358.6 1,863.7 2,097.9 2,605.8
Government Spending (%)
Federal Government 53.8 46.7 40.9 42.8 33.3 41.3
Defense Consumption Expenditures 40.7 36.5 26.6 27.2 19.2 23.4
Defense Gross Investment 5.0 2.6 2.3 4.0 2.4 4.2
Non-defense Consumption Expend. 8.2 9.5 12.1 10.3 10.1 11.8
Non-defense Gross Investment 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.9
State and Local Government 45.2 53.0 59.3 57.0 66.7 58.9
S&L Consumption Expenditures 34.5 42.0 49.9 47.2 54.0 48.3
S&L Gross Investment 10.0 10.4 9.5 9.8 12.7 10.6
Federal Government Spending (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Functional Decomposition)
General Public Service 4.2 4.5 6.4 5.3 4.6 5.6
National Defense 84.6 79.6 68.5 73.2 65.0 66.6
Public Order and Safety 0.5 0.7 1.5 2.0 4.6 4.9
Transportation 2.0 2.2 3.0 2.6 3.3 3.1
Economic Affairs (excl. Transport) 6.0 7.8 11.4 9.5 11.1 8.9
Housing and Community Services 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2
Health 2.5 3.6 6.2 5.9 8.5 7.7
Recreation and Culture 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5
Education 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.7
Income Security 0.5 1.0 2.2 1.1 1.5 1.7
State and Local Govt. Spending (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Functional Decomposition)
General Public Service 6.7 8.4 10.2 11.4 11.6 11.6
Public Order and Safety 11.7 11.2 13.1 14.5 15.2 15.9
Transportation 23.4 18.8 15.5 14.2 13.5 11.8
Economic Affairs (excl. Transport) 5.2 4.9 5.1 4.0 3.5 3.6
Housing and Community Services 5.3 4.5 4.2 3.9 2.9 3.4
Health 3.7 3.6 3.5 4.2 2.9 4.1
Recreation and Culture 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0
Education 40.8 43.5 42.9 41.9 43.6 43.3
Income Security 1.6 2.7 3.7 3.9 4.6 4.4
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA Tables Section 3
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Table 2: Multipliers for GDP, Consumption and Investment. Standard errors are
italicised. Inv is Investment and Dur, ND, and Svs are durables, nondurables and services
consumption, respectively. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 20 percent,
10 percent and 5 percent levels.
GDP Dur ND Svs Inv
O
n
Im
p
a
c
t
Govt. Spend 0.72*** (0.19) 0.01 (0.05) 0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.05) -0.09 (0.14)
Def Cons 0.89*** (0.31) -0.02 (0.07) 0.04 (0.05) -0.05 (0.07) 0.01 (0.22)
Def Inv 0.68 (0.76) -0.08 (0.17) -0.11 (0.12) -0.14 (0.17) -0.08 (0.53)
Non-def Cons -0.25 (0.40) -0.13* (0.10) -0.03 (0.07) 0.00 (0.09) -0.64*** (0.28)
Non-def Inv 5.76* (3.08) -0.75 (0.71) -0.15 (0.50) 0.39 (0.69) 3.03* (2.10)
S&L Cons -0.34 (0.94) -0.10 (0.23) 0.21* (0.15) 0.59*** (0.21) -1.49*** (0.66)
S&L Inv 2.66*** (0.54) 0.51*** (0.13) 0.00 (0.10) -0.02 (0.13) 0.50 (0.39)
4
Q
u
a
r
te
r
s
Govt. Spend 0.36 (0.38) -0.05 (0.07) 0.03 (0.06) -0.07 (0.10) -0.19 (0.24)
Def Cons 0.35 (0.60) -0.05 (0.11) 0.02 (0.10) -0.17 (0.16) -0.08 (0.40)
Def Inv -3.88*** (1.43) -0.79*** (0.26) -0.47*** (0.22) -0.85*** (0.36) -2.47*** (0.92)
Non-def Cons 0.03 (0.81) -0.10 (0.15) -0.02 (0.13) 0.08 (0.21) -0.41 (0.53)
Non-def Inv 7.52* (5.80) 0.29 (1.07) 0.42 (0.92) 1.52 (1.57) 1.65 (3.86)
S&L Cons 1.02 (1.74) 0.41 (0.33) 0.67*** (0.27) 0.96*** (0.46) -0.65 (1.15)
S&L Inv 1.78* (1.11) 0.13 (0.20) 0.09 (0.17) -0.21 (0.29) 0.68 (0.73)
8
Q
u
a
r
te
r
s
Govt. Spend 0.28 (0.52) -0.05 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08) -0.04 (0.15) -0.13 (0.30)
Def Cons -0.61 (0.85) -0.18 (0.15) -0.06 (0.14) -0.24 (0.25) -0.57 (0.50)
Def Inv -3.50* (2.15) -0.59* (0.39) -0.51* (0.34) -0.96* (0.60) -1.83* (1.26)
Non-def Cons -0.12 (1.21) -0.10 (0.22) -0.01 (0.20) -0.06 (0.36) -0.34 (0.70)
Non-def Inv 16.43** (8.71) 1.18 (1.49) 1.61 (1.42) 2.98 (2.48) 7.90* (5.08)
S&L Cons 4.38** (2.66) 0.73* (0.45) 1.01*** (0.40) 1.81*** (0.76) 1.74 (1.55)
S&L Inv 1.29 (1.52) 0.19 (0.28) 0.08 (0.25) -0.22 (0.45) 0.46 (0.92)
41
Table 3: Multipliers Mean Differences Test. This table reports t-statistics for pair-
wise differences in government spending multipliers for GDP. The asterisks *, **, *** denote
statistical significance at two-tailed 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
O
n
Im
p
a
c
t
Govt. Spend (1)
Defense Cons (2) 0.47
Defense Inv (3) -0.05 -0.26
Nondefense Cons (4) -2.2** -2.25** -1.08
Nondefense Inv (5) 1.63* 1.57 1.6 1.93*
State & Local Cons (6) -1.1 -1.24 -0.84 -0.09 -1.89*
State & Local Inv (7) 3.37*** 2.81*** 2.12** 4.31*** -0.99 2.75***
4
Q
u
a
rt
e
rs
Govt. Spend (1)
Defense Cons (2) 0.00
Defense Inv (3) -2.87*** -2.73***
Nondefense Cons (4) -0.37 -0.32 2.38
Nondefense Inv (5) 1.23 1.23* 1.91** 1.28*
State & Local Cons (6) 0.37 0.36 2.17** 0.51 -1.07
State & Local Inv (7) 1.22 1.13 3.13*** 1.28 -0.97 0.37
8
Q
u
a
rt
e
rs
Govt. Spend (1)
Defense Cons (2) -0.88
Defense Inv (3) -1.71* -1.25
Nondefense Cons (4) -0.3 0.33 1.37
Nondefense Inv (5) 1.85* 1.95* 2.22** 1.88*
State & Local Cons (6) 1.51 1.79* 2.3** 1.54 -1.32
State & Local Inv (7) 0.63 1.09 1.82* 0.72 -1.71* -1.01
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A Technical Appendix
In this technical appendix, we discuss the issue of non-fundamentalness and the details
of our econometric model and estimation strategy. In section A.1, we discuss how non-
fundamentalness is related to fiscal foresight. In section A.2, we present a simple model
to develop some intuition on how a large information approach may help to address
non-fundamentalness. Finally, in sections A.3 and A.4 we provide details of our Large
Bayesian VAR model and the estimation strategy.
A.1 Non-fundamentalness in Fiscal SVAR models
Let us assume that the true equilibrium solution of the equations describing the economy,
at any point in time, can be approximated by a VARMA process solution to the reduced
form system of equilibrium equations,
Φ(𝐿)𝑌𝑡 = Θ(𝐿)𝑢𝑡 , 𝑢𝑡 ∼ 𝑤.𝑛.(0, 𝐼𝑞) (1)
where 𝑌𝑡 is an𝑁 -dimensional vector of macroeconomic variables and 𝑢𝑡 is a 𝑞-dimensional
vector of orthonormal white noise processes, that can be thought of as structural shocks.1
The AR and MA filters are polynomial matrices defined as Φ(𝐿) = 𝐼𝑁 +
∑︀𝑝1
𝑘=1 𝜑𝑘𝐿
𝑘 and
Θ(𝐿) =
∑︀𝑝2
𝑘=0 𝜃𝑘𝐿
𝑘, respectively, where 𝐼𝑛 is the 𝑛-dimensional identity matrix and 𝐿 is
the lag operator. The AR component is generally assumed to be causal and stationary.
*NOT FOR PUBLISHING
†Contact: Department of Accounting, London Business School, Regent’s Park, NW1 4SA, London,
United Kingdom. Email: aellahie@london.edu.
‡Contact: Department of Economics, London Business School, Regent’s Park, NW1 4SA, London,
United Kingdom. Email: gricco@london.edu.
1𝑌𝑡 can be either an 𝑁 -dimensional vector whose entries are 𝐼(0) or 𝑘-differences of 𝐼(𝑘) processes.
This condition amounts to requiring that all the complex roots of the determinants of
the AR matrix lie outside the unit circle.
Given the assumption of stationarity, the process 𝑌𝑡 always admits a Wold represen-
tation, that is a decomposition in 𝜖𝑡 ≡ 𝑌𝑡 − 𝑃 (𝑌𝑡|{𝑌𝑡−1, 𝑌𝑡−2, . . . }), the linear forecast
errors of 𝑌𝑡,
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛿𝑡 +Ψ(𝐿)𝜖𝑡 𝜖𝑡 ∼ 𝑤.𝑛.(0,Σ𝑞) (2)
where Ψ(𝐿) = 𝐼𝑁 +
∑︀∞
𝑘=1 𝜓𝑘𝐿
𝑘 and 𝛿𝑡 is a deterministic process.
If we assume that the MA component is also invertible – i.e., all the complex roots
of the determinants of the MA matrix lie outside the unit circle – then 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡 belong
to the space generated by present and past values of 𝑌𝑡. The structural shocks 𝑢𝑡 are a
linear combination of innovations 𝜖𝑡, and we say that 𝑢𝑡 is 𝑌𝑡-fundamental.
If instead the determinant of the MA matrix has at least one root inside the unit
circle, than 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡 do not live in the same space. In particular, 𝑢𝑡 does not belong to
the space generated by present and past 𝑌𝑡 and we say that 𝑢𝑡 is 𝑌𝑡-non-fundamental.
2
A crucial point is that fundamental and non-fundamental MA components are ob-
servationally equivalent. Two ARMA processes with the same AR component and with
MA components such that
Θ(𝐿)𝑢𝑡 = Θ˜(𝐿)?˜?𝑡 (3)
Θ(𝑧)Θ(𝑧−1)′ = Θ˜(𝑧)Θ˜(𝑧−1)′ (4)
have identical covariance generating functions and spectra. All the observationally
equivalent representations are generated by Blaschke transformations (see Lippi and
Reichlin (1994)).3
Essentially, a Blaschke transformation is the product of rotations and transforma-
tions that flip fundamental roots into non-fundamental ones, and vice versa. While
simple rotations account for the form of non-uniqueness that Sims (1980) describes
and that require an appropriate selection of an identification scheme (e.g., recursive
identification, sign restrictions, long run restriction, etc.), more general Blaschke trans-
formations relate fundamental to non-fundamental representations.
Non-fundamentalness can appear in the estimation of economic models either en-
dogenously – a common feature of rational expectations models (see Hansen and Sargent
(1980)) – or exogenously, due to the dynamics of exogenous variables (e.g., technology
shocks in Lippi and Reichlin (1993)). In the case of fiscal shocks, non-fundamental-
ness may arise endogenously due to the anticipation of fiscal shocks by forward-looking
agents. It is worth noting that non-fundamentalness is an issue only when estimating
structural models and not for forecasting. In the latter case, only the estimate of the
innovations’ space is necessary.
To understand how endogenous non-fundamentalness can plague the estimation of
fiscal policy shocks, we need to acknowledge that the econometrician only observes a
2If at least one of the roots of the determinant of the MA matrix lie on the unit circle, the MA
component is non-invertible but is not necessarily non-fundamental.
3A complex-valued matrix is a Blaschke matrix if it has no poles inside the unit circle and
𝐵(𝑧)𝐵(𝑧−1)′ = 𝐼. It can be shown that a generic 𝑛-dimensional Blaschke matrix can be expanded
into the product of a finite number of constant orthogonal matrices and of diagonal matrices with a
Blaschke factor 𝑅(𝛼, 𝑧) = diag( 𝑧−𝛼1−?¯?𝑧 , 𝐼𝑛−1).
ii
subset 𝑦𝑡 of the vector of variables fully describing the economy, 𝑌𝑡. Structural shocks
affecting the economy 𝑌𝑡, will typically also affect the subset of macroeconomic variables,
𝑦𝑡. However, a 𝑌𝑡-fundamental structural shock 𝑢𝑡 can become 𝑦𝑡-non-fundamental when
observing only a limited amount of information about the economy-wide process 𝑌𝑡.
The standard econometric practice consists of estimating an approximated VAR(𝑝)
model with data about a small number of variables, 𝑦𝑡,
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴(𝐿)𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 , 𝜀𝑡 ∼ 𝑤.𝑛.(0,Σ𝜀) , 𝑡 ∈ Z (5)
where 𝐴(𝐿) is a 𝑛 × 𝑛 filter such that det(𝐼𝑛 − 𝐴(𝑧)) has roots only outside the unit
circle. This condition is equivalent to the assumptions of causality and stationarity for
the VAR model. In the SVAR literature it is usually assumed that structural shocks
are 𝑦𝑡-fundamental. For 𝑦𝑡-fundamental shocks, innovations 𝜀𝑡 coincide with 𝑢𝑡 up to an
orthogonal transformation. Therefore, once eq. (5) is estimated, the structural shocks
can be obtained as ?^?𝑡 = ?^?𝜀𝑡, for an appropriately selected rotation matrix 𝑅, such that
𝑅𝑅𝑇 = 𝐼𝑛, where the estimate ?^? of 𝑅 is obtained by imposing 𝑛(𝑛 − 1)/2 restrictions
derived from economic theory.
There are two possible issues in the standard SVAR econometric procedure. First,
a finite lag VAR representation of the underlying process may not exist and therefore a
VAR(𝑝) model may estimate biased impulse response functions. Second, the assumption
of fundamentalness of structural shocks with respect to the observed variables may not
hold since crucial state variables do not appear in the VAR.
In the context of fiscal SVARs, the anticipation of fiscal shocks can introduce non-
fundamentalness in the structural shocks. Forward-looking agents incorporate informa-
tion about future fiscal shocks in their expectations and would react to announcements
of policy changes. An econometrician estimating a standard SVAR would miss the true
structural shocks (the signals about future changes in taxes or government spending),
and would instead identify actual policy implementation which likely lags the announce-
ment. In this case, structural shocks 𝑢𝑡 would belong to the space spanned by future
values of 𝑦𝑡 as well. This phenomenon is called fiscal foresight and is at the core of the
Ramey (2011) critique of traditional fiscal SVAR.
This criticism is well founded in economic theory. Using a neoclassical growth model
with two shocks, Leeper et al. (2013) show that fiscal foresight poses formidable chal-
lenges to the econometrician. Even in a very simple setting, anticipation effects can
distort interpretation of the identified shocks. In particular, they show that the MA
representation of any pair of variables selected from capital, taxes and technology, is
non-fundamental.
A.2 A Simple Model
In order to illustrate the large information approach to address the issue of fundamental-
ness, let us consider a simple model derived from the ones in Perotti (2011) and Leeper
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et al. (2013)4
MaxE𝑡
∞∑︁
𝑖=0
𝛽𝑖 log𝐶𝑡+𝑖 (6)
s.t. 𝐶𝑡 +𝐾𝑡 +𝐺𝑡 = 𝑍𝑡𝐾
𝛼
𝑡−1 (7)
where 𝐶𝑡, 𝐾𝑡 and 𝐺𝑡 are consumption, capital and government expenditure, respectively.
The productivity factor 𝑍𝑡 follows a lognormal process with mean zero and variance 𝜎
2
𝑧 .
The agent’s Euler equation is
E𝑡
[︂
𝛽(1 +𝑅𝑡+1)
𝐶𝑡
𝐶𝑡+1
]︂
= 1 (8)
and at the non-stochastic steady state 1+𝑅𝑠𝑠 = 1/𝛽 and𝐾𝑠𝑠 = (𝛼𝛽)
1
1−𝛼 . Log-linearising
around the steady state we get
𝑐𝑡 − E𝑡[𝑐𝑡+1] + E𝑡[𝑧𝑡+1] + (𝛼− 1)𝑘𝑡 = 0 (9)
where the lower case letters denote log deviations from the steady state. Linearising the
budget constraint and substituting it into the Euler equation, we find the equilibrium
equation for 𝑘𝑡. For sufficiently small government consumption at the steady state, 𝐺,
the equation admits a stable solution
𝑘𝑡 − 𝜆1𝑘𝑡−1 = − 1
𝜆2𝛼𝛽
∞∑︁
𝑖=0
1
𝜆𝑖2
E𝑡 [((𝐺+ 𝛼𝛽)𝑧𝑡+𝑖+1 − 𝑧𝑡+𝑖) +𝐺(𝑔𝑡+1+𝑖 − 𝑔𝑡+1)] (10)
where 𝜆1 < 1 and 𝜆2 > 1 are the roots of the characteristic equation.
We assume that log deviations for government consumption expenditure follow an
exogenous process specified by
𝑔𝑡 = 𝛾𝑡|𝑡−1 (11)
where 𝛾𝑡|𝑡−1 is a white noise shock that is known at time 𝑡−1. We assume that due to an
implementation lag the innovation is known to the agent one lag before being realised.
The equilibrium solution for 𝑘𝑡 is
𝑘𝑡 − 𝜆1𝑘𝑡−1 = 1
𝜆2𝛼𝛽
𝑧𝑡 − 𝐺
𝜆2𝛼𝛽
𝛾𝑡|𝑡−1 +
𝐺
𝜆2𝛼𝛽
(︂
1− 1
𝜆2
)︂
𝛾𝑡+1|𝑡 . (12)
We can rewrite the equation in more compact form as
𝑘𝑡 − 𝜆1𝑘𝑡−1 = 𝛿𝑧𝑡 + 𝜋0𝛾𝑡|𝑡−1 + 𝜋1𝛾𝑡+1|𝑡 (13)
where the coefficients are defined as in the prior equation.
The VARMA representation is⎛⎝ 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1− 𝜆1𝐿
⎞⎠⎛⎝ 𝑔𝑡𝑧𝑡
𝑘𝑡
⎞⎠ =
⎛⎝ 𝐿 00 1
𝜋1 + 𝜋0𝐿 𝛿
⎞⎠(︂ 𝛾𝑡+1|𝑡
𝑧𝑡
)︂
(14)
4A similar argument has been proposed in Forni and Gambetti (2010) for factor models.
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Given the invertibility of the AR component, we can reformulate the system in the
MA representation ⎛⎝ 𝑔𝑡𝑧𝑡
𝑘𝑡
⎞⎠ =
⎛⎝ 𝐿 00 1
𝜋1+𝜋0𝐿
1−𝜆1𝐿
𝛿
1−𝜆1𝐿
⎞⎠(︂ 𝛾𝑡+1|𝑡
𝑧𝑡
)︂
(15)
The MA component for the square subsystem given by capital and government con-
sumption expenditure is non-fundamental.(︂
𝑔𝑡
𝑘𝑡
)︂
=
(︂
𝐿 0
𝜋1+𝜋0𝐿
1−𝜆1𝐿
𝛿
1−𝜆1𝐿
)︂(︂
𝛾𝑡+1|𝑡
𝑧𝑡
)︂
(16)
To verify that the structural shocks are non-fundamental, it is sufficient to observe that
the determinant of the relative squared MA component is equal to 𝛿𝑧
1−𝜆𝑧 and has root
equal to zero, inside the unit circle. This is also true for the other two-by-two subsystems(︂
𝑔𝑡
𝑧𝑡
)︂
=
(︂
𝐿 0
0 1
)︂(︂
𝛾𝑡+1|𝑡
𝑧𝑡
)︂
(17)
(︂
𝑧𝑡
𝑘𝑡
)︂
=
(︂
0 1
𝜋1+𝜋0𝐿
1−𝜆1𝐿
𝛿
1−𝜆1𝐿
)︂(︂
𝛾𝑡+1|𝑡
𝑧𝑡
)︂
(18)
for which the determinants of the MA matrix are 𝑧 and 𝜋1+𝜋0𝑧
1−𝜆𝑧 , respectively and have
roots 0 and −𝜋1/𝜋0, both less than one in modulus.
To recover fundamental representations of the two-by-two system for 𝑧𝑡 and 𝑔𝑡 we
could apply the following Blaschke matrix(︃
1 0
0
𝑧+
𝜋1
𝜋0
1+
𝜋1
𝜋0
𝑧
)︃
. (19)
Note that a priori it is difficult to guess the exact form of the transformation needed.
Instead, including the larger set of variables, we get a finite order VAR(2) (of reduced
rank) for the VARMA representation for which the structural shocks are fundamental:⎛⎝ 1 + 𝜋0𝜋1𝐿 𝛿𝜋1𝐿 − 1𝜋1𝐿+ 𝜆1𝜋1𝐿20 1 0
−𝜋0
𝜋1
− 𝛿
𝜋1
1
𝜋1
− 𝜆1
𝜋1
𝐿
⎞⎠⎛⎝ 𝑔𝑡𝑧𝑡
𝑘𝑡
⎞⎠ =
⎛⎝ 0 00 1
1 0
⎞⎠(︂ 𝛾𝑡+1|𝑡
𝑧𝑡
)︂
. (20)
Adding an unanticipated shock (the structural shock of interest) to government
spending
𝑔𝑡 = 𝛾𝑡|𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 , (21)
we get the equilibrium solution for 𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡 − 𝜆1𝑘𝑡−1 = 𝛿𝑧𝑡 + 𝜋0𝛾𝑡|𝑡−1 + 𝜋1𝛾𝑡+1|𝑡 + 𝜋0𝜀𝑡 . (22)
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The VAR(2) representation is now:⎛⎝ 1 + 𝜋0𝜋1𝐿 𝛿𝜋1𝐿 − 1𝜋1𝐿+ 𝜆1𝜋1𝐿20 1 0
−𝜋0
𝜋1
− 𝛿
𝜋1
1
𝜋1
− 𝜆1
𝜋1
𝐿
⎞⎠⎛⎝ 𝑔𝑡𝑧𝑡
𝑘𝑡
⎞⎠ =
⎛⎝ 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
⎞⎠⎛⎝ 𝜀𝑡𝑧𝑡
𝛾𝑡+1|𝑡
⎞⎠ . (23)
We can observe that the unanticipated fiscal shocks can be recovered with a recursive
identification since the matrix of contemporaneous correlations is:
𝐴0 =
⎛⎝ 1 0 00 1 0
−𝜋0
𝜋1
− 𝛿
𝜋1
1
𝜋1
⎞⎠ 𝐶 =
⎛⎝ 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
⎞⎠ . (24)
A.3 A Large Fiscal Bayesian VAR
Banbura et al. (2010) show that by applying Bayesian shrinkage, it is possible to handle
large unrestricted VARs. This allows the VAR framework to be applied to empirical
problems that require large data sets, potentially solving the issue of omitted variable
bias. In particular, De Mol et al. (2008) prove that for the analysis of data sets that are
characterised by strong collinearity, which is typically the case for macroeconomic time
series, it is possible to increase the cross-sectional dimension by consistently setting the
degree of shrinkage in relation to the size of the model. In this way, it is possible to
control for over-fitting while preserving the relevant sample information.
We consider the following VAR(4) model:
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐶 + 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑦𝑡−2 + 𝐴3𝑦𝑡−3 + 𝐴4𝑦𝑡−4 + 𝜀𝑡 (25)
where 𝜀𝑡 is an n-dimensional Gaussian white noise, with covariance matrix Σ𝜀, 𝑦𝑡 is a
𝑛 × 1 vector of endogenous variable and 𝐶, 𝐴1,. . . , 𝐴4 and Σ𝜀 are matrices of suitable
dimensions containing the model’s unknown parameters.
We adopt conjugate prior distributions for VAR coefficients belonging to the Normal-
Inverse-Wishart family
Σ ∼ 𝐼𝑊 (Ψ, 𝑑) (26)
𝛽|Σ ∼ 𝑁 (𝑏,Σ⊗ Ω) (27)
where 𝛽 ≡ vec([𝐶,𝐴1, . . . , 𝐴4]′), and the elements Ψ, 𝑑, 𝑏 and Ω embed prior assumptions
on the variance and mean of the VAR parameters. These are typically functions of lower
dimensional vectors of hyperparameters. This family of priors is commonly used in the
BVAR literature due to the advantage that the posterior distribution can be analytically
computed.
As for the conditional prior of 𝛽, we adopt two prior densities used in the existing
literature for the estimation of BVARs in levels: the Minnesota prior, introduced in
Litterman (1979), and the sum-of-coefficients prior proposed in Doan et al. (1983).
∙ Minnesota prior: This prior is based on the assumption that each variable fol-
lows a random walk process, possibly with drift. This is quite a parsimonious,
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though reasonable approximation of the behaviour of economic variables. Follow-
ing Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997), we set the degrees of freedom of the Inverse-
Wishart distribution to 𝑑 = 𝑛 + 2 which is the minimum value that guarantees
the existence of the prior mean of Σ.5 Moreover, we assume Ψ to be a diagonal
matrix with 𝑛× 1 elements 𝜓 along the diagonal. The coefficients 𝐴1, . . . , 𝐴4 are
assumed to be a priori independent. Under these assumptions, the following first
and second moments analytically characterise this prior:
𝐸[(𝐴𝑘)𝑖,𝑗] =
{︃
𝛿𝑖
0
𝑗 = 𝑖, 𝑘 = 1
otherwise
(28)
𝑉 [(𝐴𝑘)𝑖,𝑗] =
{︃
𝜆2
𝑘2
𝜗𝜆
2
𝑘2
𝜓𝑖
𝜓𝑗/(𝑑−𝑛−2)
𝑗 = 𝑖
otherwise.
(29)
These can be casted in the form of (27). The coefficients 𝛿𝑖 that were originally
set by Litterman were 𝛿𝑖 = 1 reflecting the belief that all the variables of interest
follow a random walk. However, it is possible to set the priors in a manner that
incorporates the specific characteristics of the variables. We set 𝛿𝑖 = 0 for variables
that in our prior beliefs follow a white noise process and 𝛿𝑖 = 1 for those variables
that in our prior beliefs follow a random walk process.6 We assume a diffuse prior
on the intercept. The factor 1/𝑘2 is the rate at which prior variance decreases with
increasing lag length. The coefficient 𝜗 weights the lags of the other variables with
respect to the variable’s own lags. We set 𝜗 = 1. The hyperparameter 𝜆 controls
the overall tightness of the prior distribution around the random walk or white
noise process. A setting of 𝜆 =∞ corresponds to the ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates. For 𝜆 = 0, the posterior equals the prior and the data does not influence
the estimates.
The Minnesota prior can be implemented using Theil mixed estimations with a
set of 𝑇𝑑 artificial observations – i.e., dummy observations
𝑦𝑑 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
diag(𝛿1𝜓1, ...., 𝛿𝑛𝜓𝑛)/𝜆
0𝑛(𝑝−1)×𝑛
....................................
diag(𝜓1, ....., 𝜓𝑛)
....................................
01×𝑛
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ 𝑥𝑑 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
𝐽𝑝 ⊗ diag(𝜓1, ....., 𝜓𝑛)/𝜆 0𝑛𝑝×1
.................................... .........
0𝑛×𝑛𝑝 0𝑝×1
.................................... .........
01×𝑛𝑝 𝜀
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
where 𝐽𝑝 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(1, 2, ..., 𝑝).
7 In this setting, the first block of dummies in the
matrices imposes priors on the autoregressive coefficients, the second block imple-
ments priors for the covariance matrix and the third block reflects the uninforma-
tive prior for the intercept (𝜀 is a very small number).
5The prior mean of Σ is equal to Ψ/(𝑑− 𝑛− 1)
6Details of our prior selection are provided in Appendix B where we describe the dataset used.
7This amounts to specifying the parameter of the Normal-Inverse-Wishart prior as
𝑏 = (𝑥′𝑑𝑥𝑑)
−1𝑥′𝑑𝑦𝑑,Ω0 = (𝑥
′
𝑑𝑥𝑑)
−1,Ψ = (𝑦𝑑 − 𝑥𝑑𝐵0)′(𝑦𝑑 − 𝑥𝑑𝐵0)
.
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∙ Sum-of-coefficients prior: To further favour unit roots and cointegration and
to reduce the importance of the deterministic component implied by the estima-
tion of the VAR conditioning on the first observations, we adopt a refinement of
the Minnesota prior known as sum-of-coefficients prior (Sims (1980)). Prior liter-
ature has suggested that with very large datasets, forecasting performance can be
improved by imposing additional priors that constrain the sum of coefficients. To
implement this procedure we add the following dummy observations to the ones
for the Normal-Inverse-Wishart prior:
𝑦𝑑 = diag(𝛿1𝜇1, ...., 𝛿𝑛𝜇𝑛)/𝜏
𝑥𝑑 = ((11×𝑝)⊗ diag(𝛿1𝜇1, ...., 𝛿𝑛𝜇𝑛)/𝜏 0𝑛×1) . (30)
In this set-up, the set of parameters 𝜇 aims to capture the average levels of each
of the variables, while the parameter 𝜏 controls for the degree of shrinkage and as
𝜏 goes to ∞, we approach the case of no shrinkage.
The joint setting of these priors depends on the set of hyperparameters 𝛾 ≡ {𝜆, 𝜏, 𝜓, 𝜇}
that control the tightness of the prior information and that are effectively additional pa-
rameters of the model.
The adoption of these priors has been shown to improve the forecasting performance
of VARmodels, effectively reducing the estimation error while introducing only relatively
small biases in the estimates of the parameters (e.g. Banbura et al. (2010); De Mol et al.
(2008); Sims and Zha (1996)).
The regression model augmented with the dummies can be written as a VAR(1)
process
𝑦* = 𝑥*𝐵 + 𝑒* (31)
where the starred variables are obtained by stacking 𝑦 = (𝑦1, . . . , 𝑦𝑇 )
′, 𝑥 = (𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑇 )′
for 𝑥𝑡 = (𝑦
′
𝑡−1, . . . , 𝑦
′
𝑡−4, 1)
′, and 𝜀 = (𝜀1, . . . , 𝜀𝑇 ) together with the corresponding dummy
variables as 𝑦* = (𝑦′ 𝑦′𝑑)
′, 𝑥* = (𝑥′ 𝑥′𝑑)
′, 𝑒* = (𝑒′ 𝑒′𝑑)
′. The starred variables have length
𝑇* = 𝑇 + 𝑇𝑑 in the temporal dimension, and 𝐵 is the matrix of regressors of suitable
dimensions.
The resulting posteriors are:
Σ|𝑦 ∼ 𝐼𝑊
(︁
Ψ˜, 𝑇𝑑 + 2 + 𝑇 − 𝑘
)︁
(32)
𝛽|Σ, 𝑦 ∼ 𝑁
(︁
𝛽,Σ⊗ (𝑥*′𝑥*)−1
)︁
(33)
where 𝛽 = vec(?^?), ?^? = (𝑥*′𝑥*)−1𝑥*′𝑦* and Ψ˜ = (𝑦*−𝑥*?^?)′(𝑦*−𝑥*?^?). It is worth noting
that the posterior expectations of the coefficients coincide with the OLS estimates of a
regression with variables 𝑦* and 𝑥*.
A.4 Prior Selection
In selecting the value of the hyperparameters of our priors, we adopt the pure Bayesian
method proposed in Giannone et al. (2012).8
8In prior literature, a number of heuristic methodologies have been proposed to set the hyperpriors
either by maximising the out-of-sample forecasting performance of the model (see Doan et al. (1983))
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From a purely Bayesian perspective, the informativeness of the prior distribution
is one of the many unknown parameters of the model that can be inferred given the
conditional posterior distribution of the observed data. Therefore, hyperparameters can
be optimally chosen by maximising the posterior distribution given by the product of
the maximum likelihood (ML) of the observed data conditional on the hyperparameters,
𝑝(𝑦|𝛾), and the hyperprior distribution 𝑝(𝛾)
𝑝(𝛾|𝑦) ∝ 𝑝(𝑦|𝛾) · 𝑝(𝛾) (34)
The hyperprior can be viewed as a level two prior on the hyperparameters, while the
maximum likelihood is the probability of the data as a function of the hyperparameter
obtained by integrating over the VAR coefficients
𝑝(𝑦|𝛾) =
∫︁
𝑝(𝑦|𝜃, 𝛾)𝑝(𝜃|𝛾)𝑑𝜃 . (35)
For a flat hyperprior, the posterior coincides with the ML, hence the choice of the
hyperparameters can be thought of as maximising the one-step-ahead out-of-sample
forecasting ability of the model. This proposed procedure selects the optimal amount
of shrinkage given the sample and the model. The selected priors are tighter when the
model features many unknown coefficients relative to the available data.
In order to use this methodology for a large information set, we make additional as-
sumptions to reduce the number of hyperparameters to be estimated and the uncertainty
in the estimation of the VAR coefficients.9
Following the empirical BVAR literature we fix the diagonal elements 𝜓 and 𝜇 using
sample information. Although, from a Bayesian perspective the parameters 𝜓 should
be set using only prior knowledge, it is common practice to pin down their value using
the variance of the residuals from a univariate autoregressive model of order 𝑝 for each
the variables. In the same way, the sample average of each variable is chosen to set the
𝜇 parameters.
Finally, we set a very loose sum-of-coefficients prior choosing 𝜏 = 50𝜆. In this way,
the determination of a rather large number of hyperparameters is reduced to selecting
a unique scalar that controls for the tightness of the prior information.
Following Giannone et al. (2012), we adopt a Gamma distribution with mode equal
to 0.2 (the value recommended by Sims and Zha (1996)) and standard deviation equal
to 0.4 as hyperprior density for 𝜆.10 Given the choice of conjugate priors, the ML is
available in closed form and the selection of the tightness of 𝜆 amounts to maximising
a closed form posterior (see Giannone et al. (2012)).
or by controlling for over-fitting by choosing the shrinkage parameters that yields a desired in-sample
fit (see Banbura et al. (2010)).
9In the largest specification of our Large VAR we have about 50 scalar hyperparameters controlling
the tightness of the priors.
10Using a flat hyperprior for 𝜆, as well as an in-sample methodology to fixing 𝜆 as discussed in
Banbura et al. (2010), we obtain similar numerical results. Moreover the results are similar over a wide
range of values for 𝜏 and 𝜆.
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B Data Appendix
We identify the relevant components of U.S. national income for our study using the
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) which are made available by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce on their website.11
All data for the macroeconomic variables used in our model specifications are from
publicly available sources. The primary source for the macroeconomic series is FRED
Economic Data available from the website of the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis
(FRED).12 Where available we use the real economic series from FRED, all of which are
chained to 2005 dollars. Where the length of the real series is shorter than our sample
period, we collect the nominal series and deflate it using the relevant chained-type price
deflators which are all indexed at 100 in 2005. These various deflators are available on
the website of the Bureau of Economic Analysis.13
The total public debt series (PUBDEBT) is collected from the website of the U.S.
Department of Treasury.14
We use the consumer sentiment index developed by the University of Michigan avail-
able on their website.15 The survey data is also available as part of the FRED Economic
Data.
We collect federal government and state and local government spending forecasts
published in the Survey of Professional Forecasters available on the website of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.16
The Barro-Redlick marginal tax rate is the income weighted average marginal tax
rate from the website of the National Bureau of Economic Research.17
The Real Exchange Rate is the average of the prior 3 month real effective exchange
rate index for U.S. Dollars calculated by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
and made available on the BIS website.18 BIS calculates the real effective exchange
rate as geometric weighted averages of bilateral exchange rates adjusted by relative
consumer prices. The weighting pattern is time-varying, and is based on bilateral trade
data. Since the data series begins in Q1:1964, we compute the real exchange rate for
the period Q1:1959 to Q4:1963 using the methodology described by BIS.
11www.bea.gov/national/index.htm. A guide to the description and calculation methodology of
the main economic accounts is available at http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/national/nipa/methpap/
mpi1_0907.pdf
12research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
13http://www.bea.gov/itable/index.cfm
14http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/Pages/index.aspx
15http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/
16http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/
17http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/barro-redlick/currentp1.html
18http://www.bis.org/statistics/eer/index.htm
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